On April 4 this year was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 37th
death anniversary. This article written earlier is reproduced with some additions.
January 15, 2015
By Saeed Qureshi
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto didn’t
leave any worthwhile legacy except that
he took power from a military chief and barely after six years it went back to another army chief General Ziaul Haq, a heartless
religious fanatic. On 5 July 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq deposed
Bhutto in a bloodless coup. Bhutto was tried patently by a biased judicial
court for a murder case and was executed by hanging on April 4 1979.
Had Yahya Khan not delayed
or refused to transfer power under pressure from Bhutto to Awami league that
won the majority seats. Had Bhutto not refused to attend the national assembly
session called after the 1970 elections in Dacca? Had Bhutto not threatened the
PPP elected National Assembly members not to go the Dacca to participate in the
inaugural session and if they did their legs to be broken.
Had he not raised the bogey
of “tum udhar ham ither” (you on that side we on this) Pakistan would
not have dismembered. The civil war had not erupted with horrific atrocities
and the humiliating defeat and surrender of Pakistani army before the Indian
army in Dacca on December 16, 1971, had not happened.
Even if the six points were
accepted on the face, Federation of Pakistan would still have remained intact.
But Bhutto preferred the separation of East Pakistan to have power at least in
West Pakistan.
With the defeat of Pakistan
army in East Pakistan, the possibility of continuation of power in the hands of
army was also removed. By killing two birds with one stone Bhutto assumed power
in West Pakistan. But this power was short lived and what happened in the
aftermath has been explained in the foregoing.
The paramount question intriguing
the discerning students of history has been that why an iconic, revolutionary
and charismatic leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met with a tragic end. He took the
political realm of Pakistan by storm and assailed the minds and hearts of
people within a short span of time.
He soared to the political
horizon of Pakistan like a meteorite yet plummeted with the same speed and
intensity. The charm and magic of Bhutto’s personality and his rhetorical style
and revolutionary mandate bewitched the people of Pakistan who looked up to him
as a redeemer and the architect of a new
Pakistan that he vowed to “built from ashes”
and by “picking the pieces” of a colossally mauled left-over Pakistan
after December 1971 war with India.
It would not be in vain to adjudge
him a leader who touched the zenith of people’s love and approbation after the
founder of Pakistan Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Had he not committed
egregious blunders due to his personal weaknesses he could have been equated
with Kamal Ataturk of Turkey and Jamal Abdul Nasir of Egypt and similar iconic leaders?
Yet despite a dazzling and unprecedented popularity, within six years, he was
desperately fighting for his political survival as well as for his life.
He was endowed with the
frame of a firebrand revolutionary that performed exceedingly fast and furious
to uproot a debased system of governance and initiated instead one premised on
parliamentary democracy. He was the
proponent of the Muslim unity and deserves the credit for convening the OIC
1974 conference in Pakistan.
He liberalized the society from
official strait jackets, cumbersome rules and bureaucratic tangles. People were
greatly relieved and motivated about a monumental change in the offing. He has
the glorious distinction of being the father of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons program.
A flurry of reforms including land reforms promised a new era of hope and
progress. A new Pakistan as pledge by
Mr. Bhutto started emerging.
Although the release of
Pakistan’s prisoners of war and reclaiming captured territory by India were
considered as Bhutto’s spectacular achievements through Simla Accord, yet I am
of the opinion that India could not keep such a huge captured army for long,
nor could she hold on to the occupied territory indefinitely.
Bhutto’s overwhelming weakness
was that he was loyal to no one: not even to his lofty ideals. He possessed a
voracious obsession for power. What I want to point out that Bhutto would go to
any extent for retaining power. He ruled like a dictator in the garb of a civilian
head of government.
During his dwindling fortunes after 1977 elections, he
sacrificed his cosmopolitan and secular principles by lobbying with ultra
conservative forces and courting discredited feudal classes in order to stick
to power.
His letter written in April
1958 to the then president of Pakistan general Iskander Mirza extolling him as
more exalted that the founder of Pakistan was a sordid display of rank
flattery. His exploitation of Tashkent Pact (10 January 1966) was a smart
tactical move that swept away a powerful military dictator with a bruised and
demonized image.
Bhutto was genetically averse to anyone’s
popularity. His companions, who stood with him through thick and thin and faced
extreme persecution and oppression during Ayub Khan’s time, were disgraced and sacked
one after another on such flimsy grounds as someone getting popular in public
view or opposing some of his policies. Alas! His weaknesses overshadowed his watershed
achievements and that resulted in his tragic end.
Presently, in order to
highlight Bhutto suspicious nature and his morbid proclivity to tame and
frighten his ministers and party leaders, I have to refer to some of the
observations made by Baloch leader Sher Baz Mazari in his book, “The Journey to
Disillusionment”
“If any of his subordinates
showed even a modicum of independence, he would be swiftly punished...“Even
Bhutto’s close associates and cabinet ministers now lived in dread and fear of
the unpredictability of their master’s temper”…”Bhutto would not brook any
criticism…”Bhutto’s obsession with maintaining a aura of invincibility was so
strong that he would spare no one, not even those who had done him valuable and
devoted service over the years”.
About Bhutto’s devious
machinations that were part of his politicking style, Mr. Mazari wrote, “I
had known Bhutto for some 23 years. To him lying, double-dealing and deceit
were normal means of attaining and keeping power”
His FSF was a Gestapo type
dreaded outfit, created to terrorize and tyrannize his colleagues and political
rivals. In his book, Mr Mazari provides an account of many erstwhile colleagues
of PPP who suffered enormously at the hands of Bhutto’s FSF that brooked no
mercy for anyone if ordered by Bhutto to be fixed physically and brutalized. J.
A. Rahim is one example who was mercilessly beaten up.
But let us thrash out the
events then took place prior to the Bhutto’s ascension to power, first as the
president and then as prime minister of Pakistan. The foremost question is that
who was primarily responsible for the historic blunder of igniting a civil war
in formerly East Pakistan? A political leader of the genius of Bhutto could have
never supported deployment of military in East Pakistan knowing well it would
entrap Pakistan army.
Yet by a clever ruse not
only did he refuse to sit with a majority party but convinced debauch Yahya Khan
to take the fatal army action in East Pakistan. Pakistan army was not only defeated
but earned a lasting ignominy of surrender. There was a tacit or studied collusion
between the then president Yahya Khan and Mr. Bhutto for an army operation in
East Pakistan for the reason no one can justify.
If the democratic process
was to be honored then why was it necessary for Mr. Bhutto to warn the elected
parliament members that their legs would be broken if they go to East Pakistan to
attend the National Assembly session in the aftermath of the elections. That
was a blatant denial of a majority party’s right to form the government.
Were the army top brass and
Mr. Bhutto not cognizant that sending of army to subdue a whole province was
immoral, unconscionable, illegal and suicidal? Were they not aware of a stark
reality that in-between was an inveterate hostile country and the supply line
of army personnel, weapons, food and medicines could not be carried on either
by air or by sea.
Bhutto’s tenure could be
portrayed as a kind of a façade of democracy that cloaked his authoritarianism
and was the most dominant reason for his downfall. As already stated that all his aides and colleagues who remained with
him through thick and thin and were ideological bulwark of his revolution, were
forced to leave through gross intimidation, witch-hunting, physical tortures,
humiliation and through every brutal means carried out through the FSF and personally
by Mr. Bhutto by foul mouthing and abusing.
As such when the army intervened on July
5, 1977, the PPP was depleted of the committed and loyal hardcore cadres to
stand by him. He fought a lonely legal war in front of the prosecutors who were
his sworn enemies for other reasons.
Bhutto’s penchant for power
was so chronic and deep-rooted that contrary to his lofty ideals of making
Pakistan a democratic, modern, secular, liberal country with civil society
abandoned these cherished goals and dashed these on the rock of expediency.
The
Pakistan National
Alliance (right wing political alliance of 9 parties against PPP) launched an earth
shaking countryside agitation against the rigging of the 7 March 1977 and for Nizam-e- Mustafa. The PPP unbelievably won 155 out of
200 seats in the Parliament.
He frantically tried to win the support of the religious
right to stay in power. He compromised his treasured credentials of an
enlightened leader by accepting all the demands of PNA and downgrading him to
the level of a religious fanatic or zealot.
What a volte-face that he
sold his lofty status of the architect of a new modern Pakistan and auctioned
his revolutionary mandate for the sake of power. Now such perfunctory measures as
making Friday a holiday, declaring Ahmadis as non Muslims, banning liquor and
horse races would not make Pakistan an Islamic state.
But in order to deflate
the hurricane of commotion for his ouster, he bargained his secular credentials,
his conscience and political integrity. From that moment Pakistan has been
irredeemably sinking into the abyss of religious fanaticism, lethal
sectarianism and unremitting bigotry. But even that historic betrayal couldn’t
keep him in the power saddle.
The outcome was
irretrievably disastrous for his future. The religious lot got their piece of
pie and then hastened to move for his downfall. The anti-Bhutto outburst was mounted
by all sections of society: the betrayed and disillusioned people, friend and
foes, bureaucracy, army, rival politicians, traders, students. Bhutto looked a
desolate and forlorn person “fluttering his luminous wings in vain”. The whole
scene seemed to be the replay of what Bhutto did against Ayub Khan.
In his twilight days of
power, Mr. Bhutto prolonged the process of holding talks for a rapprochement
with the opposition. When he finally agreed on the contentious issues between
him and PNA it was too late and much water had flown down the political rivers.
It clearly means that he lacked a kind of political acumen and discerning
ability to see the direction of the wind. Thus Ziaul Haq took the reins of the
government on July 5, 1977 and ruled with an iron hand till he met his tragic
fate also.
Now there is very little
logic in maligning or hating Ziaul Haq who seized power from Mr. Bhutto. Ziaul
Haq was not a politician. He was outright a dictator. He was a rigid, bigoted
religious practicing Muslim. He was an
army chief and the country was drifting towards a total chaos and breakdown. Ziaul
Haq, in addition to the army and a host of politicians and perhaps external
abettors, enjoyed full support of the Islamic parties, Imams of mosques, religious
seminaries and madrasas.
Ziaul Haq because not an
ideal moralist although he was a practicing Muslim. He did not amass wealth,
nor made mansions but decidedly lived simple and austere life. This is for his person
character. But in politics and in power all is fair: all the more when the
religious sections of all hue and cries were behind him and the power fell in
his lap like the ripened fruit. He had the abetment of certain foreign
countries as well
Let us give credit to Ziaul
Haq for a proxy war in Afghanistan, though at the behest of America and the
west that forced Soviet Union to leave Afghanistan with an historic disgrace. As
a result of Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, the Muslim caucuses that the
czars of Russia had forcibly annexed became independent.
During the Afghanistan
war, in a brief conversation with journalists including this scribe, Ziaul Haq
obliquely made a revealing statement to the effect that a miracle was about to
happen in Afghanistan. By that he meant the Soviet defeat and liberation of Afghanistan
for the communist stranglehold. That proved to be true.
I am not an admirer of Ziaul haq but I believe
that he was more prudent, crafty and skillful than Mr. Bhutto.
He never claimed that he was a political
wizard or that he favored democracy and fundamental rights. He crushed the
freedom of expression, curbed independence of media, and maimed the organs of
civil society including judiciary and parliament. But he did these things
because these were wrong. In simple words it was not his mandate. The dictators
around the world have been doing obnoxious things and oppress their people to
stay in power corridors.
Zia was not a lone dictator
who suppressed the social freedom and further Islamized the society by more stringent
Islamic injunctions. But he was seldom apologetic about what he was doing. He
was the votary and spokesperson of a rigid, orthodox Islamic regime that he
served well even employing extreme tyranny. Bhutto was people’s chosen
representative yet he used the same coercive methods and intrigues that bring
them at par.
Ziaul Haq and later General
Musharraf assumed power by default and because of the peculiar conditions that surfaced
by the wrong doings and inept policies of their predecessors. Bhutto’s grave mistakes
of curbing Baluchistan insurgency by use of brute military force, his
amendments in the constitution for accumulation of more powers, his
maltreatment of the opposition leaders, the massive rigging of 1977 elections,
behaving as a merciless and intolerant lord to his peers and devoted
colleagues, betrayal of his revolutionary mandate and finally using excessive
force before and after 1977 elections to curb the agitations whipped up by PNA
and other groups, were all catalysts for his downfall.
But tacitly dismembering
Pakistan by raising the slogan, “you on that side and we on this side” was
proverbially the final nail in the coffin. It clearly meant you rule there
(former East Pakistan) and we rule here (West Pakistan) as two independent parties.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was
right in forming a political party. He was justified in challenging two
military dictators. But he was wrong in boycotting a democratic process based
upon popular vote which could have saved Pakistan from dismemberment and unerasable
ignominy of defeat and surrender of Pakistan army vis a vis Indian army.
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