By
Saeed Qureshi
Pakistan’s
nuclear program that culminated into the fabrication of an atom weapon was originally
conceived in December 1965, when IAEA nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan met
with the-then-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
in Vienna. In that meeting Munir A. Khan informed Bhutto about
the status of Indian nuclear program that could pose a threat to Pakistan’s
security.
Later Bhutto arranged
a meeting of Munir Khan with President Ayub Khan in London. Munir Khan informed the
President that the Indian nuclear program was of a weapon production facility and that Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent for her security, and
survival. President Ayub Khan swiftly brushed off the proposal by remarking
that “Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money”.
When Mr. Bhutto assumed power in December
1971, his first and foremost priority was to take up Pakistan’s nuclear
program. For this most pressing task, he called
a confidential meeting of senior academics, scientists and engineers in Multan on
20 January 1972, known as "Multan Meeting”. In that meeting two most
paramount decisions were made. Mr. Bhutto took a pledge from the assembly of 50
scientists to attain the nuclear capability for making an atomic weapon within
three years.
The second important
decision was to appoint the nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as Chairman
of Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who, until then, had
been working as Director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria.
Munir Ahmad
Khan remained the Chairman of the PAEC from 1972-1991. During this period much
of the initial ground work of crucial research and experimentation through
various stages of nuclear technology for making a weapon was covered by him and
his associates.
Dr,
Qadeer’s induction came much later in 1976 and that divided a unified structure
for promoting Pakistan’s atomic program into two rival institutions. A. Q. Khan
created the Khan Research Laboratories previously
known at as Project-706 and later by Engineering Research Laboratories
(ERL) (1976-1983).The PAEC remained under the command of Munir Ahmad Khan
who worked tirelessly till he left that prestigious organization.
The
rivalry between Munir Ahmad Khan and Dr. Qadeer Khan on one side and the PAEC
and KRL on the other had kept the nuclear bomb project at tenterhooks for
quite some time. Dr. A. Q. Khan was an exponent of Uranium based program while
his counterpart scientists in PAEC were in favor the plutonium based technology
to craft a nuclear bomb.
The
fear that Munir Khan had conveyed to Mr. Bhutto and president Ayub Khan in
1965, about India’s nuclear potential, became a frightening reality in 1974,
when India conducted a surprise nuclear
test, code-named “Smiling Buddha”. India clandestinely worked on this project in the aftermath
of the surrender of Pakistani troops in Dacca and cessation of the Eastern wing
of Pakistan in 1971. India later conducted on May 11 and 13 1998, five more
nuclear tests under the code name “Operation Shakti”.
The first
Indian detonation of Atomic device was an added blow to the defense capability
of Pakistan that had still not recovered from the stunning trauma of East
Pakistan debacle at the hands of an inveterate foe. The situation against
Pakistan further aggravated with the 1998 Indian atomic tests.
Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after
India's second nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five
nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai district, Balochistan known as Chagai-I and Chagai-II. The Chagai-1 was detonated by KRL
(Kahuta Research Laboratories and the Chagai-II was carried out by the PAEC.
Let us
now make a comparison between the roles of both Munir Ahmad Khan and Dr. A. Q.
Khan in order to determine who deserves to be called the father of the
Pakistan’s atom bomb.
Dr. A. Q Khan joined the atomic bomb project in
1976, and became part of the enrichment division at PAEC and continued to push
his ideas for uranium based technology even though it had been a secondary and
low priority. When Bashiruddin Mahmood was appointed
as the director of the PAEC, Qadeer Khan refused to work under him. That was a clear
demonstration of vanity and insubordination.
But Mr.
Bhutto came to his help and appointed him as head of the program. In 1983,
Abdul Qadeer Khan's appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President
Zia-ul-Haq and he renamed the ERL as KRL after his name as a matter of self-
glorification. In 1984, the KRL claimed to carry out its own nuclear cold test
of a weapon, but this was unsuccessful as PAEC under Munir Khan had already carried out the test in 1983, codenamed: Kirana-I.
Following
the Indian second test, there was inexorable pressure on Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif to come up with a matching response. In several meetings with the Prime
Minister, Dr. Qadeer Khan tried to persuade him to allow carrying out of these
tests at Kahuta because he wanted to pocket the entire credit for his KRL. The
prime minister did not agree to his proposal.
However, with the intervention of the-then COAS,
General Jahangir Karamt, prime minister agreed to include Dr. Khan into the team
that was assigned to conduct the atomic tests in Baluchistan. Interestingly the
rivalry between KRL headed by A. Q. Khan and PAEC culminated into two separate
tests. The first known as Chagai-1 was performed by KRL and the second remembered
as Chagai-II, by PAEC under the command of Dr. Samar Mubarikmand. Many of Qadeer
Khan's colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full credit for
a feat; he had been only a part of it.
Dr. Khan was also in the habit of
taking up such projects which were theoretically interesting but practically
unfeasible. As such he wanted Pakistan to work only on Uranium weapon as
compared to that of Plutonium. It was more because of his personal grudge with
Munir Khan because of Munir Khan’s expertise in the plutonium route. Despite
his opposition, the “Plutonium option and all the related activities to
establish infrastructure for making a bomb continued unabated”.
By
the time A. Q. Khan joined the atomic energy portfolio in 1976,
“Munir Ahmad Khan had already completed the site selection for the Kahuta
enrichment plant, initial procurement of vital equipment, construction of its
civil works, and recruitment of staff for it. The Kahuta Enrichment Project was
called Project-706 launched by the PAEC. Like the plutonium programme, it was under the
overall control and supervision of Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan”. He was
accompanied in these activities among others, by a brilliant PAEC
physicist-turned diplomat, S.A. Butt.
While
As Qadeer Khan and his team stumbled on many occasions in harnessing the
centrifuge technology, it was due to vital technical support from PINSTECH and
PAEC infrastructure and scientists that he managed to move forward. A.Q. Khan's
uranium enrichment known as Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) was not independent
of PAEC, even after his acquiring complete control and autonomy for KRL. Of the 24 stages that were inevitable in making a bomb, Dr. Khan could complete
only one. The remaining 23 were completed by the PAEC team of nuclear
scientists.
The
so called “Wah Group” assembled and chosen by Munir Ahmad Khan did a marvellous
job under his express watch and guidance. Bbetween
1983 and 1990, besides achieving other crucial bench marks, this group “developed
an air-deliverable bomb and conducted more than 24 cold tests of nuclear
devices with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment”.
Unquestionably
Munir Ahmad Khan worked tirelessly in creating an infrastructure for producing
nuclear fuel for Pakistan's nuclear plants. Yet that would was later imbibed,
utilized and projected by A. Q. Khan for
his claim as the father of the Pakistan’s nuclear device and program. But by
taking advantage of the foundational work done by Munir Khan and his
illustrious companions, Dr. Khan can claim to be a runner-up but not the front runner
in equipping Pakistan with a nuclear deterrent.
By
the time these monumental tests were conducted, Dr. Khan was left alone in the
field to lay claim of being the originator of these lustrous achievements.
However the fact is that the spadework for these accomplishments had already
been completed by Munir Khan and his colleague scientists. But unfortunately
Munir Khan’ remained an unsung hero and his stupendous contribution in leading Pakistan
towards the nuclear power status remained obscure and eclipsed.
There was an element of strict
secrecy that Munir Ahmad Khan and his colleagues maintained with regard to the
nuclear research and development they were engaged in. They would shun
publicity and avoid media glare. On the contrary, Dr. Khan was a past master in
publicizing his role although it was insignificant in comparison to that of
PAEC team. He is alleged to be in the habit of distributing checks to the
journalists for highlighting and adulating his contributions and even writing
articles and books on him.
Nawaz
Sharif despite immense pressure from the United States and other world powers
did not budge and went ahead in achieving that historic breakthrough of making
Pakistan also a nuclear power in comparison to India. Dr. A. Q. Khan, at best, can be a foster
father. The real father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, who deserves this
meritorious title, is indeed Munir Ahmad Khan.
By
the year 1991 when Munir Khan retired, the profound groundwork was already in
place to undertake the atomic tests. Incidentally, at that time, there was no
political will to take a decision on this momentous issue. Dr. A. Q Khan was
then ruling the roost of the nuclear regime in Pakistan particularly the KRL.
When the nuclear tests were conducted in 1998, Dr. Khan could be the only
recipient of the spectacular honor associated with that historic feat.
By
sheer default Dr. A. Q. Khan as head of the KRL, was showered with laurels for
the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan. If it is only the tests, the credit
should go to the then prime minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif. Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto is to be credited as the real architect of the Pakistan’s nuclear regime
and atom bomb.
Perhaps
the most appropriate parable in case of Munir Ahmad Khan would be that a person
builds a house with great deal of efforts, input of time and money but then
cannot live it for some unavoidable reasons. In the meantime, another person
from his family, by a sheer of quirk of circumstances, becomes the occupant of
that house.
The
countrymen forgot and perhaps most of the people even did not even know as to who
built this grand castle and who inherited it. Traditionally, it is only the
actors on the front stage that that get most of the acclaim, honor and popularity
and not those who remain behind the curtain, although their contribution is
equally awesome and important.
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